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Natalya Vince* 
When seventeen-year-old student Baya Hocine was put on trial in Algiers in late 
1957, accused of planting bombs for the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale 
(FLN), the French colonial authorities sought out her school reports for the case file. 
Baya Hocine’s teachers describe an excellent student: extremely intelligent with a 
lively personality, although reluctant to express any unhappy emotions.1 Could her 
teachers have guessed that this high-achieving pupil of the French education system 
in colonial Algeria would go on to commit such a violent expression of anti-
colonialism, planting a bomb in an Algiers stadium that killed two people and injured 
24 others? It seems unlikely. Unrepentant, Baya Hocine was condemned to death, 
then reprieved, and passed the rest of the liberation struggle in prison until Algerian 
Independence was finally won in 1962. Twenty years later, she was a deputy in the 
Algerian National Assembly during the debates around the introduction of a Family 
Code. Baya Hocine energetically argued against the Code, which institutionalized 
gender inequality and reduced women to the status of minors for life, only to be 
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booed and shouted down by male deputies.2 The incident created a small scandal: 
how could these men so disrespect such a well-known figure of the anti-colonial 
resistance? The Family Code was nevertheless passed in 1984, by which time Baya 
Hocine had already resigned from the National Assembly and the party of the FLN. In 
May 2000, Baya Hocine died abroad. When her body was repatriated, no official 
delegation awaited her, just a group of her former cellmates and sisters-in-arms, 
dismayed by the government’s indifference.3 The state nevertheless tried to redeem 
itself by renaming a university hall of residence in the Bab Ezzouar area of Algiers 
the Cité universitaire Baya Hocine in honor of the war veteran simultaneously 
celebrated and forgotten. 
The focus of this paper is a small group of Algerian women with similar 
trajectories to that of Baya Hocine. These women, born when Algeria was still 
French, were amongst the rare “French Muslim” girls—to use colonial terminology—
to have attended French schools in colonial Algeria. In 1954, the year the War of 
Independence began, 91 per cent of the “French Muslim” population in Algeria was 
illiterate, and only 4.5 per cent of “French Muslim” women could read and write.4 
The FLN’s female urban bombers (fida’iyat in Arabic) who participated in the “Battle 
of Algiers” between January and October 1957 were largely drawn from this group of 
educated, francophone young women who dressed in “Western” clothes. They 
became part of the minority of women who physically bore arms for the FLN’s Armée 
de Libération nationale (ALN) during the war—the massive contribution of Algerian 
women to the Independence struggle being instead overwhelmingly in civilian 
networks which hid, fed and cared for male urban guerrillas and rural maquisards. By 
autumn 1957, nearly all of the women in the bomb network had been captured by the 
French army. The “Battle of Algiers” was largely over, a military victory for the 
French, but a highly damaging exercise in terms of the image of the French army and 
colonial rule on the international stage. Often tortured and tried by military courts, 
these women received heavy prison sentences. Six, including Baya Hocine, were 
given the death penalty, although no woman was executed. 
The subject of intense interest both in France and Algeria during the war, 
these urban bombers are today the best-known mujahidat (women resisters) in 
Algeria. Ninety-seven per cent of the 336,784 war veterans officially recognized by 
the Ministry of Mujahidin (Ministry of War Veterans) are men—this small percentage 
of women no doubt reflecting the predominantly military criteria for gaining war 
veteran status, which tends to exclude the kinds of wartime roles accomplished by a 
largely female civilian population.5 After 1962, many of the mujahidat of the “Battle 
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in Honour of Baya Hocine, Algeria, Algiers, 17 June 2002). 
4 Thirteen per cent of men were literate. Djamila Amrane, Les Femmes Algériennes 
dans la guerre (Paris, 1991), 27. 
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Colonial and Post-Colonial Identities 155 
of Algiers” worked for the new Algerian state, either in the civil service or as one of 
the few female deputies in the National Assembly; others became journalists, lawyers, 
or medical professionals. To put this in context, in 1966, only 1.82 per cent of women 
in Algeria were in paid employment.6 
Both during the colonial period and after Independence, in different ways and 
for different reasons, these women have been part of both a privileged minority and a 
discriminated against mass. Whilst the trajectories of these women are clearly 
exceptional, a consideration of how this group of mujahidat have constructed their 
identity—born under French colonialism to grow old under the single party regime of 
the FLN—is highly revealing of the contradictions of two Republics: the République 
française and the République démocratique et populaire d’Algérie. This paper begins 
by considering the relationship between these “French Muslim” women and the 
French colonial state: a relationship characterized on both sides by a chasm between 
the image and reality of what the “Other” represented. The second part of this paper 
examines how Algerian post-colonial identity was constructed against France 
linguistically, culturally and historically, and the problems and opportunities that this 
presented for the mujahidat of the urban bomb network. Finally, this paper looks at 
the reopening of the debate in 2000 on the use of torture by the French army during 
the War of Independence and how this revealed cracks in previous constructions of 
identity. This paper is based on extensive interviews with eleven women who were 
part of the Algiers bomb network and who participated in the “Battle of Algiers” 
through planting bombs, gathering intelligence or transporting arms, medicine and 
messages. This was part of a wider oral history project that I carried out between 2005 
and 2007, interviewing women in rural and urban areas who undertook a range of 
roles during the independence struggle.7 
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7 This oral history work was supported by a variety of other sources, including 
documents at the Service historique de l’armée de terre (SHAT, which has since 
become part of the Service historique de la Défense, SHD) in Paris, the Centre des 
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thirty female veterans. I also carried out a survey of ninety-five students at a teacher 
training college in Algiers on their attitudes towards the war, veterans, the teaching of 
history and the transmission of memory. 
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“French Muslim” women and the colonial state: interactions and misrepresentations 
The main reason why so few “French Muslim” girls were educated in state-run 
(public) schools under the colonial administration was because not enough places 
were made available. Prior to the Second World War, rejecting the French education 
system was widely considered a form of resistance by the colonized population, but 
by 1954 this was a less popular attitude. Indeed, for the majority of women whom I 
interviewed who went on to participate in the “Battle of Algiers,” this French 
education went hand-in-hand with an anti-colonial education at home. These 
interviewees came from families in which nationalist ideas of various inspirations 
already circulated: fathers, uncles or older brothers were members of the Parti du 
Peuple Algérien (PPA), or inspired by the “ulama,” the association of Muslim 
theologians, or indeed anti-imperial Marxists. The fact that these girls had access to 
education was often—but not always—the result of their family having relative 
material comfort compared to the rest of the impoverished colonized population. 
Among my interviewees, few were as middle class as law student and urban bomber 
Zohra Drif, whose father was a local qadi (judge of “indigenous affairs”), but their 
fathers were often the owners of a grocery shops, bakeries or hammams (public 
baths), government clerks, or even employees of the gendarmerie. 
This dual education, French colonial and Algerian nationalist, demonstrates 
the failure of French attempts to prolong its domination through assimilation—
because, of course, with their French education and culture, European dress and in 
many cases relative material comfort, these women should have been amongst the 
most “assimilated” members of the female colonized population. Indeed, they perhaps 
should have been even more loyal to Algérie française than their male counterparts: 
from 1958 onwards, one of the key strands of the French government’s “pacification” 
policy in Algeria was a direct appeal to “French Muslim” women of all social strata, 
with the message that becoming “more French” would emancipate them from the 
weight of tradition and religious law. This campaign to win hearts and minds included 
organizing literacy classes in remote villages, allowing Muslim women to vote for the 
first time in 1958, placing them under the jurisdiction of French marriage law in 1959 
rather than the Muslim “personal status”8 and even staging a public unveiling of a 
few women in the centre of Algiers in May 1958. In terms of contemporary echoes, 
the idea that young Muslim women are more easily integrated into the French 
Republican model than their violent, disaffected brothers seems not to have lost any 
of its force within either the French political class or the media. This seems evident in 
gendered representations of the banlieue, and it is perhaps not by chance that upon his 
election as president in 2007 Nicolas Sarkozy appointed Fadela Amara, the founder of 
Ni putes ni soumises, to the post of Secretary of State for Urban Policy and chose 
Rachida Dati, whose brothers have had frequent run-ins with the law, to be the first 
Minister of Justice of Maghrebi origin.9 During the Algerian War, this attempt to win 
over the Muslim population through women seems to have met with little success. It 
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9 For more on contemporary constructions of Muslim men and women in France, see 
Nacira Guénif-Souilamas, “The Other ‘French Exception’: Virtuous Racism and the 
War of the Sexes in Postcolonial France,” French Politics, Culture and Society 24:3 
(2006): 23-41. 
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nevertheless prompted the FLN to respond with its own propaganda, promoting the 
message that women’s emancipation would only come with the liberation of Algeria 
from the colonial yoke.10 
Both archival evidence and the memoirs of French army officers reveal that 
the French authorities had difficulty coming to terms with the idea that these 
apparently Europeanized young women, commonly referred to as “évoluées,” could 
turn against them. Colonel Yves Godard was involved in the capture of Zohra Drif in 
1957, a moment subsequently immortalized on film in Gillo Pontecorvo’s The Battle 
of Algiers (1966). In 1961, as a negotiated peace seemed increasingly likely, Godard 
joined the extreme right-wing Organisation de l’armée secrète (OAS), determined to 
maintain Algérie française at all costs. Condemned to death by a French court, and 
then amnestied in 1968, Godard ended his days in Belgium, where he also wrote his 
1972 memoirs. It is clear from these memoirs that Godard cannot understand how 
Drif, whom he describes as an attractive, French-educated young woman, could get 
mixed up with the “bandits” of the FLN. He states that with her European dress and 
appearance she could easily pass for “the daughter of a colonist” and blames a few 
stupid remarks about her Arab name from European students at her law school for 
pushing her into clandestine activity—as if her engagement was some kind of 
unfortunate mistake.11 Indeed, this French stereotype of the pro-French “emancipated 
Muslim woman” was exploited by the FLN, who deliberately chose European-
looking young women to plant a number of bombs as well as gather intelligence. 
Yet the nationalist education which these young women received at home and 
the colonial injustices to which they were witness did not simply nullify their French 
education. On the contrary, their anti-colonialism could be inspired by their 
knowledge of French history. Baya Hocine kept a diary whilst incarcerated in the 
infamous Barberousse prison in Algiers in 1957. In one entry she writes: 
Even when I was very young I already knew the principles established by 
the French Republic of 1789, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, which have 
dominated the political and social landscape. Moreover, the history 
lessons that I received at school clearly showed me that nationalist and 
revolutionary movements were in no way considered subversive.  On the 
contrary, all my textbooks spoke of those who wished to shake off the 
yoke of foreign domination with admiration and respect.12 
Beyond the textbooks, teachers clearly played a key role shaping the values and ideas 
that they passed onto their students. Whilst many incongruously drummed into their 
pupils the history of “Nos ancêtres les Gaulois,” a minority of teachers became 
critical of colonial impositions and expressed this in the way they taught. Indeed, one 
of the seven FLN women bombers condemned to death was Jacqueline Guerroudj, a 
French primary school teacher.13 For all of these women educated in “French 
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and we will emancipate you: France, the FLN and the Struggle over Women in the 
Algerian War of National Liberation 1954-1962” (Ph.D. diss., London School of 
Economics, 2004). 
11 Yves Godard, Les Trois Batailles d’Alger, Tome I: Les paras dans la ville (Paris, 
1972), 340-341. 
12 SHAT/SHD 1 H 1246/D2. 
13 Jacqueline Guerroudj, interview by author, Algiers, December 15 and 19, 2005. See 
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Republican values,” the treatment which they were subjected to by French army 
torturers came as a shock. Zohra Drif told me, “We were extremely idealistic; we 
fought France without fighting “France.” We told ourselves that this was the 
birthplace of the Rights of Man. But that wasn’t what we saw on the ground.”14 
Relations between these women and the colonial French state were thus 
characterized on both sides by a chasm between the image and the reality of what the 
“Other” represented. For the French state, these European-dressing, French-educated 
évoluées should have been good collaborators. For these young women, their 
admiration for France’s Enlightenment intellectuals and Republican struggles sunk 
into the horror of the French colonial abuses which they had experienced or witnessed 
first hand, and perhaps for the first time given their often privileged upbringing. Yet 
for the mujahidat, Independence was not about rejecting everything that originated 
from France. Whilst they refused to be assimilated into the colonial system, they had 
assimilated French liberal ideas. These women hoped Independent Algeria would be a 
country that put into action the Liberty, Equality, Fraternity and Human Rights which 
remained empty phrases for “French Muslims” under colonialism. Unfortunately, 
French colonialism left a poisonous legacy, particularly for Algerian women, by 
indelibly associating secular law and women’s rights with the taint of colonial 
imposition. 
Constructing the post-colonial identity: conflict and contradictions 
Upon Independence in 1962, a key priority for the leaders of the FLN who 
successfully took power was to construct a history and identity to legitimize them and 
their newly independent Algeria. This was no easy task. In the words of Algerian 
psychiatrist Khaled Benmiloud, writing in the newspaper Révolution Africaine on 1 
February 1964, Algerians knew what they no longer were, but did not have a clear 
idea of who they were. As a result, official history and identity was in many ways 
constructed as the antithesis of what “France” was perceived to represent—
linguistically, culturally and historically. Algerian official history positioned the War 
of National Liberation as the zenith of 132 years of continuous struggle against the 
colonial invader, a war “by the people, for the people,” a people whose interests 
would be represented by war veteran leaders in the single-party state of the FLN.15 
Furthermore, the FLN enshrined into the Algerian constitution the famous expression 
of cultural anti-colonialism of Abdelhamid Ben Badis, the founder of the 1930s 
religious reformist movement, the “ulama”: “Arabic is my language; Algeria is my 
country; Islam is my religion.” In 1963, Islam was declared the state religion and 
Arabic the national language. A program of Arabicizing all national institutions, and 
                                                                                                                                           
also her autobiography Des Douars et des prisons (Alger, 1993). 
14 Zohra Drif, interview by author, Algiers, 11 June 2005. 
15 It is worth defining what “FLN” means in post-independence Algeria. The FLN has 
evolved from a wartime coalition of anti-colonialists (1954-1962), to the parti unique 
in post-independence Algeria and has remained, even after the introduction of 
political pluralism in Algeria in the late 1980s, a dominant political force. The FLN is 
not just a political party, but forms part of the state apparatus. It is a fundamental 
element of what many Algerians pejoratively term le pouvoir, a politico-military 
regime incorporating a complex web of army generals, politicians and businessmen, 
monopolizing power and exchanging privileges, favors and shady deals in order to 
keep a stranglehold on power. 
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in particular the education system, was embarked upon. The construction of this new 
identity would both privilege and discriminate against the mujahidat of the “Battle of 
Algiers,” who in turn took advantage its opportunities and resisted its constraints. 
For one veteran whom I interviewed, Malika Koriche, restoring the prestige of 
the Arabic language after 132 years of French denigration was one of the most 
important consequences of Independence.16 Nevertheless, many mujahidat criticize 
the single-minded and aggressive way in which Arabicization was carried out. 
Imposing Arabic as the sole national language excluded a large minority of Algerians 
who were not Arabophone—Tamazight (Berber) is the first language spoken in 
Kabylie, the Aurès Mountains and amongst the Tuaregs in southern Algeria. 
Furthermore, Arabicization linguistically dispossessed many of the men and women 
educated under the colonial system who had fought for Independence: they spoke 
dialectical Arabic but read and wrote in French. One of the women war veterans I 
interviewed showed me her war medals but then explained that she could not read the 
inscriptions, as they were written in classical Arabic. Other women veterans had to 
learn classical Arabic. So of course did male veterans, but the language issue perhaps 
affected more women than men. During the colonial period, both boys and girls 
attended forms of the madrasa, Qur’anic schools either privately run by the “ulama” 
(madrasa musliha) or the French-run “indigenous schools” (madrasa rasmiyya), 
where they would learn classical Arabic through reciting the Qur’an—but boys were 
more likely to be sent to these schools than girls. 
Newspapers in the early years of Independence reveal that the preoccupying 
question of defining the “Algerian identity” was often posed in terms of the place that 
women should have in the new Algerian society and that this debate was inevitably 
entwined with the growing conflict between reactionary and progressive 
interpretations of the new state religion. Since the French invasion in 1830, 
conserving the private sphere—and the women who lived in it—from the eyes and 
influence of the colonizers had been considered a form of cultural resistance.17 Yet 
we have seen that some “French Muslim” women had already begun to occupy the 
public sphere before the War of Independence by going to school and university. 
Moreover, during the war, through their active support for the FLN, rural and urban 
women of all social classes entered into the public space en masse, taking on new 
roles and responsibilities. The official discourse of the FLN was that, having fought 
alongside men to achieve Independence, women’s contribution was needed to build 
the (proclaimed) socialist state. In a speech in March 1963, the first Algerian 
president, Ahmed Ben Bella, declared, “Women have already assumed their full and 
entire responsibilities. It would be a dishonor to forget [these women] today. We will 
block the path of false doctrines and destroy the false preachers of Islam and 
Arabism.”18 
                                                                                                                                           
16 Malika Koriche, interviews by author, Algiers, 18, 21 and 22 December 2005. 
17 See Julia Clancy-Smith’s article “Islam, Gender and the Making of French Algeria, 
1830-1962,” in Domesticating the Empire: Race, Gender and Family Life in French 
and Dutch Colonialisms, ed. Julia Clancy-Smith and Frances Gouda (Charlottesville 
and London, 1998), pp. 154-174. 
18 El Moudjahid, 23 March 1963. Situating this speech in its context, it is worth 
underlining that Ben Bella attacks “false preachers” of Islam and Arabism, rather than 
criticizing policy to promote an Arab-Islamic identity—which he himself supports. 
This speech is a direct attack on challenges from the “ulama” to dominate post-
independence politics. The speech thus might be seen less as a statement on gender 
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Yet whilst such speeches seemed to suggest a new era for gender relations, there were 
many men who wished nothing more than for the mujahidat to “go back to their pots 
and pans” after 1962. Zhor Zerari, a member of the Algiers bomb network who had 
been arrested, tortured and imprisoned in 1957, was brusquely expelled from a FLN 
meeting just after her release from prison in July 1962. On the eve of the official 
declaration of Independence, a soldier threatened to shoot her if she did not leave the 
meeting and “go back with the women.”19 The typical criticism of women who 
demanded social mixing between men and women and equal rights was, rather 
unsurprisingly, that they were “Westernized” or “un-Islamic.” 
In an attempt to contain both progressive and reactionary elements, the FLN 
discourse on women remained abstract and often vague, leading to few concrete 
measures and many contradictions. In 1963 the nationality law was passed, a measure 
which prevented women from automatically transmitting their Algerian nationality to 
their children. This measure targeted mixed marriages between an Algerian woman 
and a non-Algerian man.20 Yet simultaneously, one of the best-known women of the 
“Battle of Algiers,” Djamila Bouhired, the subject of numerous songs and a film by 
Egyptian director Youssef Chahine,21 married her French lawyer, Jacques Vergès, 
and had two children with him.22 In 1963 and 1964, heroines of the revolution such as 
Djamila Bouhired, Zohra Drif and Djamila Boupacha were traveling the world as 
official representatives of the FLN: symbols of the youthfulness and modernity of the 
Algerian revolution. Yet Djamila Bouhired’s state visit to Kuwait caused a scandal 
amongst Algerian traditionalists. Bouhired had descended from the plane with her 
hair uncovered, apparently provoking the Kuwaiti Minister of Education to tell the 
waiting delegation of teachers to take their hijab off.23 Disgusted by what he saw as 
the growing debauchery of society, Cheikh Abdellatif Soltani, a member of the 
“ulama” association before 1954, who had rallied to the FLN during the war, formed 
Al Qiyam (the values) in 1963. Even though President Houari Boumediene banned Al 
Qiyam, the influence of Islamist trends on policy formulation and legislation was 
growing, and the adoption of the 1984 Family Code under President Chadli Bendjedid 
might be seen as a key expression of this.24 
                                                                                                                                           
relations and more a reflection of internal power struggles. It does, however, echo a 
progressive trend present in the first years of independence. 
19 Zhor Zerari, interview by author, Algiers, 21 December 2005. See also her 
interview in El Watan, 24 March 2005. 
20 In shari’a a Muslim man can marry a non-Muslim woman, but a non-Muslim man 
cannot marry a Muslim woman. At the time the nationality law was passed, the 
Algerian state was also worried about “foreign infiltration” through interethnic 
marriage. 
21 Jamila al-Jazairiya (Jamila the Algerian) (Egypt, 1958) 
22 In an interview in 1984, Djamila Bouhired asserted that she would not have married 
Jacques Vergès if he had not agreed to covert to Islam. Interview reproduced in Al-
’adath al-’arabi wa-l-duwali, 24 November 2002. The claim that wine and pork-
loving Jacques Vergès converted to Islam is considered laughable by one of his 
friends interviewed in a recent documentary about the controversial lawyer’s life. 
Barbet Schroeder, L’Avocat de la terreur, 2007. 
23 Martin Evans and John Phillips, Algeria: Anger of the Dispossessed (New Haven, 
2007), 78. 
24 It is worth noting that the delay in the passing of an Algerian Family Code contrasts 
with the situation in Morocco and Tunisia, which both became independent from 
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The Family Code has generated a significant literature25 and the role of the 
mujahidat of the “Battle of Algiers” in the front line of protests, declaring loudly that 
this was not the kind of Algeria that they had fought for, is well documented. Djamila 
Amrane, a former combatant in the FLN of European origin and author of a number 
of works on the mujahidat, argues, “There is a clear continuity between those women 
who took part in the armed struggle for independence and the women who now 
demonstrate in the streets against intolerance and the right to live in peace in different 
ways, the mark of a constantly developing Algeria.”26   
It is worth nuancing this frequently reproduced image of the mujahida. First, 
the female veterans demonstrating in the streets in the 1980s against the Family Code 
and in the 1990s against Islamic fundamentalism were, in their vast majority, from the 
educated elite who participated in the “Battle of Algiers.” Many of the rural women 
whom I have interviewed did not know what the Family Code was. Second, amongst 
this urban, educated minority of veterans, there were divisions about what tactics to 
use to oppose the code, and indeed not all of these women became involved in 
protests. Djamila Boupacha, who became an international cause célèbre from 1959 
onwards after her story of torture and rape was publicized by Gisèle Halimi and 
Simone de Beauvoir,27 provides a pertinent example of this. When I asked her 
whether she participated in demonstrations against the Family Code she replied that 
she had not, but that her husband, a deputy in the Algerian National Assembly at the 
time, had defended women’s rights. She alluded to a passage in the Qur’an where it is 
said that men can only have more than one wife if he can treat each woman equally, 
which Boupacha says is impossible—hinting that a true interpretation of religious 
teachings would render polygamy impossible.28 This is clearly a very different 
argument to that of secular feminists opposed to religion playing any role in 
determining family law. Third, for educated, urban women it could be argued that the 
Family Code has relatively little practical impact—these women tend to choose their 
husbands freely and negotiate equitable relationships with them. This is not to deny 
that, if these relationships were to break down, they would find themselves the 
potential victims of discriminatory legislation—but they would also be more likely to 
have the intellectual and material means to defend themselves and a family ready to 
aid them. 
The Family Code, for the vocal minority of urban, educated mujahidat 
involved in campaigning against it, is thus both a symbol and concrete example of 
                                                                                                                                           
France in 1956. In Tunisia, President Habib Bourguiba immediately imposed a top-
down legal reformulation of family law, outlawing polygamy, repudiation and 
recognizing maternal descendance. In Morocco in 1957, King Mohamed V 
implemented a code based on a conservative reading of shari’a (modified in 2003). 
There was clearly no senior figure Algeria with the political will to opt for a 
Bourguiba-style approach, but at the same time there was enough internal resistance 
to prevent the imposition of the Moroccan option for 22 years (1962-1984). 
25 Two recent monographs are Lucie Pruvost, Femmes d’Algérie: Société, famille et 
citoyenneté (Algiers, 2002) and Mounira Charrad, States and Women’s Rights: The 
Making of Post-Colonial Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco (Berkeley, 2001). 
26 Amrane, “Women and Politics in Algeria from the War of Independence to Our 
Day,” Research in African Literatures 30:3 (1999): 62-77. 
27 Simone de Beauvoir and Gisèle Halimi, Djamila Boupacha (Paris: Gallimard, 
1962) 
28 Djamila Boupacha, interview by author, Algiers, 11 June 2005. 
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unjust legislation reflecting a broader range of inequalities. These mujahidat are not 
the women most affected by its measures. Instead it is a symbol of a certain betrayal 
by former brothers-in-arms, a painful, codified rejection of their equal status as 
combatants. The Family Code is also convenient shorthand for some mujahidat for 
referring to a much wider debate about the exclusion of women that is not just based 
in law but in society at large, and the failure of the state since 1962 to have a real 
project for society. 
As the above quote from Djamila Amrane suggests, in the competing 
interpretations of what the War of Independence should signify, these women war 
veterans have come to be seen, particularly in Europe and North America, as 
guardians of a certain image of Algeria: in favour of a democratic and tolerant society 
in which men and women can live and work alongside each other. Whilst the Front 
Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front, FIS) in the 1980s and 1990s tried to 
position itself as legitimate heritor—the FI(L)S—of the War of Independence, 
continuing the struggle to purify Algeria of all non-Islamic influences against an 
FLN/pouvoir29 which had become corrupt and illegitimate,30 many of the mujahidat 
hoped for something quite different in 1962. When I asked them what they fought for, 
they all talk about education, an improvement in the quality of life, throwing off 
tutelage.  As Zohra Drif put it, “being ourselves, not having to judge ourselves by a 
reference.”31 When this mujahida says this, she is talking about not having to judge 
herself by a colonial reference. Yet one might well suspect that she does not want to 
have to judge herself by an Islamist code of behavior either. It is significant that many 
of the women whom I have interviewed talk about the veil as it has been widely worn 
in Algeria since the 1980s as a foreign importation from Iran (hijab) and Saudi Arabia 
(chador)—the white veil and small triangle of cloth over the face (haik) traditionally 
worn in parts of Algeria is in a very different style. 
The idea that the version of Algeria promoted by Islamist movements is 
“foreign” and “un-Algerian” was also a message actively put forward by the 
FLN/pouvoir during the violence of the 1990s, accusing the FIS of being “sons of 
harkis [those who fought in the French army during the Algerian War],” trying to 
mask their fathers’ betrayal of the Algerian nation.32 Benjamin Stora has underlined 
how Algerian women in the 1990s became an instrument of propaganda for both the 
state and Radical Islamist groups—the former using women to stigmatize their 
opponents and gain support from the West (even though, as we have seen, the FLN 
view of women was not much more progressive); the latter demonizing women as the 
source of envy and desire needing to be repressed.33 Faced with the Islamist threat in 
                                                                                                                                           
29 See note 15. 
30 An editorial of FIS newspaper El-Mounquid (The Saviour) in April 1994 opened by 
appropriating a citation from Frantz Fanon, the favored columnist of FLN journal El 
Moudjahid 1954-1962: “We are not waiting for colonialism to commit suicide. It is 
obvious that it will fiercely defend itself.” The FLN was stigmatised as hizb fransa, 
“the party of France.” 
31 Zohra Drif, interview by author, Algiers, June 11, 2005. 
32 This is a subject dealt with by Guy Pervillé, “Histoire de l’Algérie et mythes 
politiques algériens: du ‘parti de la France’ aux ‘anciens et nouveaux harkis’,” in La 
Guerre d’Algérie et les Algériens, 1954-1962, ed. Charles-Robert Ageron (Paris, 
1997), 323-331. 
33 Benjamin Stora, L’Algérie en 1995: la guerre, l’histoire et la politique (Paris, 
1995), 80.  
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the 1990s, the complex and ambiguous relationship of many mujahidat with the FLN 
and le pouvoir became to some extent less problematic. Supporting the politico-
military regime in place could be seen by these women as the only means to avoid 
Algeria “becoming another Afghanistan.” The FLN could be supported for the 
“greater good” as the lesser of two evils. 
The examples used so far in this paper demonstrate that whilst in general 
women in Algeria have had relatively little voice in political decision-making and 
have often been the object of political manipulation, the mujahidat have also managed 
to make themselves heard. In the existing literature on Algerian women, there tends to 
be a dichotomy between the two dominant images conveyed: the courageous, feisty 
woman fighter during the war becomes after 1962 the silent victim of patriarchal 
oppression, in her family and within the state.34 Whilst Algeria is undeniably a highly 
patriarchal society, looking at Algeria uniquely through the prism of “men versus 
women” can obscure what has for much of the post-Independence period been the 
crucial division in Algerian society. That is to say, the separation between war 
veterans, both male and female, and those who cannot claim participation in the War 
of Independence. Indeed, one of the most striking examples of how the citizen is 
overshadowed by the war veteran is the way in which International Women’s Day is 
celebrated in Algeria. This day, 8 March, which has been formally marked in Algeria 
since 1963, is one of the few officially celebrated dates in the Algerian calendar that 
does not have an obvious link to the War of Independence. Yet for a number of years 
under Boumediene, official celebrations for International Women’s Day began with a 
visit to the grave of a shahida, a female martyr of the War of Independence. On 8 
March 2003, Zohra Drif organized a study day for women with the title “Hopes and 
dreams: how far we’ve come.” The conference symbolically took place at the Lycée 
Hassiba Ben Bouali, an Algiers high school named after the young mujahida killed by 
the French army in the Casbah in 1957. 
The pre-eminent place that the war veteran has in Algerian society—male or 
female—manifests itself in material benefits and political social power: mujahidin do 
not pay taxes on imported cars, they get free airline tickets and better health care, they 
have access to accelerated promotions at work and since 1962 have often played a 
dominant role in governing the country. Given that today 75 per cent of the Algerian 
population is under 30, it is hardly surprising that this privileged position is 
increasingly resented, especially when it is common knowledge that the phenomenon 
of “false mujahidin” has reached vast proportions. Nevertheless, a mujahida continues 
to command respect, especially if her contribution to the war is unquestionable. The 
presence of the mujahidat in the front line of campaigns for women’s rights is 
systematically highlighted in both the Algerian and international press. Since 1988 
and the establishment of political pluralism in Algeria, a mujahida has invariably 
been the chosen figure to occupy the post of honorary president in associations which 
                                                                                                                                           
34 Amrane’s Les Femmes algériennes dans la guerre foregrounds the heroic image of 
women during the war, whilst concluding, “It seems that the social hierarchy, blurred 
during the war years for women combatants who fought and lived in the same 
conditions [as male combatants], was, after Independence, instantly re-established, 
putting each person back in his original place … [The mujahidat] tried to put the war 
between parentheses and live again,” 262. The political weakness of women after 
Independence is underlined in Monique Gadant, Le nationalisme algérien et les 
femmes (Paris, 1995) and Marnia Lazreg, The Eloquence of Silence: Algerian Women 
in Question (Londo, 1994). 
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campaign for women and children’s rights. According to Khalida Messaoudi Toumi, 
a politician of a younger generation and current Minister of Culture, when the 
mujahidat brought their support to the campaign against the Family Code, “Chadli 
could not pretend that it was a revolt of women on the extreme left demanding 
revenge on bourgeois power, or feminists fighting against misogynist power. The 
mujahidat are the most legitimate women in the eyes of the people.”35  The problem 
is, of course, who will represent the legitimate face of women when the mujahidat are 
all gone—a dilemma which results from the single-party state of the FLN building its 
legitimacy on anti-colonial militancy, real or claimed, rather than post-colonial 
citizenship. 
The reopening of the torture debate: staying silent and speaking out 
In Algeria today, current president Abdelaziz Bouteflika, himself a war veteran, does 
not hesitate to stir up anti-colonialism when in need of popular support. Denouncing 
the massacre of tens of thousands of Algerians at Sétif on 8 May 1945 or declaring at 
the French National Assembly that France needs to “exorcise” its “indelible” “moral 
debt”36 is consensual internal politics. Thus when the story of Louisette Ighilahriz 
became front page news in Le Monde on 20 June 2000, one might well have expected 
that the FLN and the Algerian state would capitalize on the situation to remind the 
Algerian population of the FLN’s legendary past. Louisette Ighilahriz was a young 
FLN activist in the Algiers bomb network who was brutally tortured and raped after 
her capture by the French army in 1957. The publication of her account unleashed a 
major scandal in French society. General Jacques Massu, who had led the military 
repression of the “Battle of Algiers,” subsequently admitted and expressed his regret 
for the widespread use of torture during the war, and a number of French soldiers 
spoke and wrote about abuses that they had seen or participated in. General Paul 
Aussaresses, another key figure in the “Battle of Algiers,” and his publisher Perrin 
were taken to court for “justification of war crimes” after he published in 2001 
Services spéciaux: Algérie 1955-1957, in which he declared that torture and summary 
executions were a regular and necessary occurrence and that the French government 
of the time was both aware of and complicit with these practices. In January 2009, his 
publishers had their conviction overturned in the European Court of Human Rights 
but not before Aussaresses lost his Légion d’honneur. In Algeria, accounts of torture 
that followed that of Louisette Ighilahriz were very often the stories of women, which 
seemed to particularly underline the barbarity of the French army. Malika Koriche, 
arrested in August 1957 after planting two bombs on a beach near Algiers, accused 
General Schmitt of brutal torture, as did Zhor Zerari.37 Yet despite the media fervor 
surrounding this retour de mémoire, the Algerian state did not speak out. Nor was 
Louisette Ighilahriz’s account unanimously supported by her fellow fighters. Instead, 
the reopening of the torture debate revealed growing fissures within the war veteran 
community, supposedly the embodiment of the Algerian identity built on anti-colonial 
unity. 
                                                                                                                                           
35 Khalida Messaoudi, Une Algérienne débout (Paris, 1996), 83. 
36 Florence Beaugé, Algérie: Une Guerre sans gloire (Paris, 2005), 35-36; and Guy 
Perville, “La Revendication algérienne de repentance unilatérale de la France,” 
Némésis, revue d’analyse juridique et politique 5 (2004), 
http://guy.perville.free.fr/spip/article.php3?id_article=22. 
37 Le Monde, 15 June 2001; 19 March 2005. 
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By refusing to participate in the torture debate, the Algerian government 
formed a complicit silence with the French government. The French official silence is 
hardly surprising—an official expression of guilt would call forth the wrath of the 
institution of the French army and perhaps open the floodgates to financial 
reparations. But the Algerian government is also uneasy with the subject of torture. 
This is partly because the Algerian War was a brutal, cruel war with both sides using 
torture and extreme violence. Internecine conflict between the FLN and harkis as well 
as political rivals such as Messali Hadj’s Mouvement national algérien (MNA) are 
not subjects that the Algerian state wishes to remember in its consensual version of 
history in which a united Algerian people fought against colonial oppression. 
However, such issues did not inhibit the FLN during the Algerian War actively using 
examples of French torture and other war crimes as a key means of attracting 
international support for the independence cause. The reluctance to get involved in 
the debate in 2000 might well have more recent causes. Algeria is, after all, coming 
out of its own “dirty war” against armed Islamist groups after the interruption of the 
electoral process in 1992. In December 1991, the FIS won the first round of 
legislative elections. To stop them taking power, the army canceled the second round. 
Whilst the Islamists assassinated intellectuals and carried out horrific massacres of 
entire villages, the Algerian army adopted all the methods of its former colonial 
ruler—arbitrary arrest, torture and the “disappearance” of up to 20,000 men. In 
February 2006 Bouteflika passed a law for “Peace and Reconciliation” ensuring that 
none of the abuses of the Algerian army can ever be punished in court—a law not 
unlike those passed in France after 1962 granting immunity to those in the French 
army guilty of human rights abuses during the war. 
The reopening of the torture debate publicly reveals the Algerian state out of 
step with the mujahidat whom it so enjoys celebrating, leaning on their historical 
legitimacy. The mujahidat who are speaking out about torture are, after all, far from 
being outcasts of the FLN regime. After independence, Louisette Ighilahriz was part 
of a number of foreign delegations for the FLN’s Union nationale des femmes 
algériennes (UNFA) and remained working for the FLN organization until her 
retirement. Malika Koriche was a FLN local councilor at Algiers town hall between 
1983 and 1991. The differences between the women’s and the state’s positions in the 
torture debate adds to the already problematic relationship which these female 
veterans have with the FLN. For whilst these women had few illusions about their 
place within the French Republic under colonialism, they equally cannot ignore the 
shortcomings of the Republic which followed, a Republic which they helped to 
create, the République démocratique et populaire d’Algérie which has never been 
democratic, has filled the pockets of power clans rather than those of the people, and 
has become increasingly unpopular. This sense of frustration with what the FLN has 
become is of course something felt by many war veterans, men and women, in 
Algeria, but perhaps particularly so by many of the mujahidat of the bomb network 
who broke down taboos excluding women from the public sphere to join the FLN, 
only to be “rewarded” with the Family Code in 1984. With a few rare exceptions, the 
mujahidat whom I have interviewed do not directly express their opposition to the 
FLN, but their unease with what the “FLN” means today for young Algerians—
corruption, inefficiency—is palpable. The mujahidat idealize the war period and are 
much more reluctant to talk about post-1962. During the war, they say, men and 
women knew what they were fighting for, the cause was noble, and those engaged 
were dedicated and honest. When I ask the mujahidat if they are still supporters of the 
FLN, their responses are ambiguous. One of my interviewees, Fadila Attia, described 
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herself as “FLN of 1954.”38 When I asked another mujahida, Saliha Djeffal, today a 
senior figure in the FLN, what the FLN slogan “by the people, for the people” meant 
for her today she replied, “For me, that’s something I believed in when I was fifteen. 
To question that now, it’s to question my whole life. And I don’t want to do that.”39 
The publication of Louisette Ighilahriz’s story did not receive unanimous 
support from her fellow war veterans, revealing cracks within the tight-knit 
community of women who participated in the “Battle of Algiers.” First, Louisette 
Ighilahriz broke a major taboo by declaring that she was raped, something which very 
few mujahidat are prepared to publicly admit. What written and oral sources exist 
suggest that rape was commonplace both in villages that the French army passed 
through and when women were arrested.40 The women whom I have interviewed all 
talk about rape but will never admit to having been raped themselves, although they 
quite freely discuss other forms of torture. In 2001, the French documentary program 
Envoyé Spécial asked Louisette to gather together a group of women to talk about 
torture and, in particular, rape. Louisette contacted the women, and they initially 
agreed, but then backed out under the pressure of their disapproving families. 
Louisette was furious and felt that her “sisters,” as the women veterans call each 
other, had let her down: “They left me to be taken for a liar. They had promised to 
talk—and I found myself alone, they just let me drop.”41 Violence and sex are still 
taboos in Algeria, and sexual violence even more so. But if Louisette Ighilahriz is 
frowned on, it is perhaps because she broke even greater taboo—she talked about 
herself. Intentionally or not, Louisette drew attention to herself as an individual, 
whereas the writing of history in Algeria since 1962 has favored the anonymous, 
homogenous mass. The select individual figures who are publicly celebrated all died 
during the war. Ignoring that Louisette had no control over the way her story was 
seized upon by the media, some mujahidat believe that she has submerged the greater 
suffering and contribution of others, speaking almost in bad taste. 
Conclusion: privileged outsiders, negotiating identities 
The women discussed in this paper have spent their lives in an uncomfortable position 
vis-à-vis the state, be it French or Algerian. Amongst the most integrated, even 
influential, members of society—because educated under the French system, or after 
1962 because they were mujahidat—these women have simultaneously been 
marginalized—under French rule because they were a colonized people and in 
Independent Algeria because social conservatism gained increasing political 
influence; because the state became militarized; because the state does not want to 
talk about torture. Whilst these women form only a tiny minority, a study of their 
place in society is an insight into much wider questions of identity. A French colonial 
state which assumed that similitude meant complicity: an Independent Algerian state 
struggling to find its identity, tangled up in its own contradictions and taking refuge in 
a fading and fracturing anti-colonial militancy: such are the issues revealed by 
examining this group of urban mujahidat, these privileged outsiders. 
                                                                                                                                           
38 Fadila Attia, interview by author, Algiers, 19 June 2005. 
39 Saliha Djeffal, interview by author, Algiers, 21 June 2005. 
40 Raphaëlle Branche, “Des viols pendant la Guerre d’Algérie,” Vingtième siècle 75 
(2001): 123-132. 
41 Louisette Ighilahriz, interview by author, 8 June 2005. 
Colonial and Post-Colonial Identities 167 
In terms of wider relevance, studying this group of female veterans of the 
Algerian War highlights the dangers of misinterpretation in contemporary 
representations in “the West” of Muslim women. The way in which the colonial 
authorities misread the motivations and political attitudes of évoluées, “Westernized” 
French Muslim women, highlights the potential pitfalls of basing analyses on surface 
appearances, and in particular dress wear, be it “Western” or “Islamic.” There is 
certainly a tendency in Europe and North America today to focus on how Muslim 
women look rather than asking them what they think; for example, veiled women are 
increasingly viewed a priori as suspect outsiders. In scholarship and activist 
literature, there is also a tendency to see the 1960s Algerian mujahida as a feminist 
symbol—but this is not the only possible interpretation of these female veterans. In 
2007, I carried out a study at a teacher training college in Algiers, investigating the 
attitudes of young Algerians, male and female, towards the teaching of history, the 
transmission of memory and war veterans, in particular the mujahidat. There is not 
space here to go into the details of my findings, but the picture that emerged is one in 
which the women of the “Battle of Algiers” and the mujahidat in general—women 
who are often unconventional and feisty individuals—have been “rewritten” in a 
language of idealized abstraction, closely linked to religion. The mujahida has been 
sanctified by these young Algerians as a symbol of pure abnegation in a holy war—
and indeed she is seen as sacrificing herself above all for God and a higher reward 
rather than for freedom and earthly self-determination. This is a very different image 
from how the women whom I interviewed see themselves and demonstrates how the 
symbol of the mujahida can be filled with multiple and contradictory meanings. 
In conclusion, what these female veterans perhaps best represent is a lifetime 
of negotiation within their society. Their lives have not necessarily been easy, their 
position sometimes uncomfortable, but they have managed to balance the often-
conflicting demands of complex identity politics. This is perhaps best summed up by 
sociolinguist Khaoula Taleb Ibrahimi. She was approached to write an article about 
the mujahidat, which was published in 2001.42 Although initially apprehensive as this 
was not her specialty, as she continued in her research, she became more and more 
interested in exploring the relationship she had with these female combatants who 
were, in her words, “in rupture with their society” Her published article expresses 
profound admiration for her foremothers, and as a small child she remembers women 
in her family hiding mujahidin and dealing with visits from the French army. 
Interviewing her, however, it becomes clear that her interest in the mujahidat is not 
simply as exceptionally brave women but as negotiators par excellence in their daily 
lives: “These are women who experienced contradictions.” Khaoula Taleb Ibrahimi, 
sociolinguist and niece of one of the “fathers” of Arabicization, state employee and 
outspoken critic of the dysfunctions of Algerian higher education, university 
professor and woman, can very much relate to this sense of contradiction, distancing 
herself from accepted norms but unwilling to entirely cut herself off from what she 
sees as her roots. She does not just admire these mujahidat; she recognizes elements 
of her own life in a very different time: 
                                                                                                                                           
42 Khaoula Taleb Ibrahimi, “Les Algériennes et la guerre de libération nationale: 
l’émergence des femmes dans l’espace publique et politique au cours de la guerre et 
l’après guerre,” in La Guerre d’Algérie ed. Mohamed Harbi and Benjamin Stora 
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I’m a woman of my time. I want to participate in the life of my country 
through what I do, by training young researchers, girls and boys. At the 
same time, I’m proud of my roots, even those which might seem 
“archaic,” because they are the foundation of what I am. And they allow 
me to enter into a relation with the other. Because if you haven’t resolved 
in your head these problems of identity, you cannot enter into contact with 
the other, whoever that may be, as a woman, it’s men, or the other who 
isn’t Algerian, who isn’t Arab, who isn’t Berber. [I have to] assume who I 
am, with all its contradictions. […] I have to compromise with society. In 
a certain way, a woman like me negotiates her equilibrium on a daily 
basis.43 
The mujahidat examined in this paper underline the importance of rejecting 
simplistic, hermetic and politically expedient versions of identity. They are clear 
examples of how identities can be multiple, permeable and, to a certain extent, 
negotiable. 
43 Khaoula Taleb Ibrahimi, interview with author, Algiers, 5 March 2007. 
